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Executive summary
In most sectors of the economy, specialisation is associated with lower costs. Yet some specialised
hospitals claim to require more generous funding than general hospitals. This claim is based on the
assertion that their patients are different, and that these differences outweigh the cost advantages of
specialisation. Unless the basis for this claim can be established, the financial incentives introduced
by Payment by Results to encourage cost reducing behaviour will be diluted.
We estimate various multiple regressions in order, firstly, to establish the extent to which the receipt of
specialised care is associated with higher treatment costs and, secondly, to evaluate hospital
performance in controlling costs. We explore how robust the results are to a range of analytical
choices by conducting various sensitivity analyses.
We use the Hospital Episode Statistics and Reference Cost databases to analyse the characteristics
and costs of all patients treated in the NHS during 2008/9. Patients are identified as having received
specialised care on the basis of specific diagnostic and procedure codes recorded in their medical
record. These codes are agreed by clinicians and form the Specialised Services National Definition
Sets.
We estimate multiple regression models to assess the extent to which receipt of specialised care
increases the cost of treatment. We test the robustness of results to choices about how costs are
calculated, how the regression models are specified and how patients are identified as having
received specialised care. In addition we assess each hospital’s relative efficiency in controlling costs,
after allowing for differences in factor prices and a wide range of patient characteristics.
We find that, after allowing for the hospital in which treatment is provided, costs are higher than for
other patients allocated to the same Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) if a patient receives one of
the following types of specialised service:
x cancer (18% higher cost)
x spinal (28%),
x neurosciences (23%),
x cystic fibrosis (38%),
x infectious disease (21%),
x children (20%),
x rheumatology (13%),
x vascular diseases (21%),
x colorectal (21%) and
x orthopaedic (21%).
The implication for Payment by Results is that ‘top-up’ payments for patients with these markers might
be made over and above the tariff associated with the HRG to which they are allocated. We
recommend that the size of additional top-up amounts to the percentage increase in costs as reported
above, these estimates being derived from our preferred model specification.
However, different values could be adopted, justified on other grounds. These grounds may include:
x Transitional arrangements, notably for children’s services, where the recommended value of
20% is substantially lower than the current 78% top-up;
x Materiality, where an additional top-up would have limited financial consequence for those
types of specialised services that are delivered to only a small number of patients;
x Sensitivity to model specification. The other model specifications generally imply lower top-up
values than those recommended above, with the exception of a model that fails to allow for
each hospital’s influence on costs.
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Our analysis demonstrates that there is substantial variation in the average cost of treatment across
the hospital sector, and that this variation is due neither to differences in the factor prices faced by
hospitals, nor to the provision of specialised services, and nor to the casemix, socio-demographic and
diagnostic characteristics of each hospital’s patients. After controlling for these diverse reasons for
cost variation, we are able to rank hospitals according to their relative cost efficiency. Those hospitals
rated as relatively inefficient will struggle financially under Payment by Results.
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1. Introduction
This paper reports work undertaken for the Department of Health’s Payment by Results (PbR) team to
investigate whether:
1. The costs associated with specialised activity are significantly different from non-specialised
activity within the same HRG;
2. Any differences in costs between specialised and non-specialised activity are due to
differences in cost efficiency.
This helps address the following PbR objectives:
x PbR gets the price ‘right’ for services, by paying a price that ensures efficiency and value for
money for the taxpayer, and incentivises the provision of care that is responsive to individual
needs;
x The system is fair and transparent, through consistent fixed price payments to providers
based on volume and complexity of activity.
In broad terms, our analysis of data from 2008/9 explores whether patients who receive specialised
services as part of their care package have higher costs than those who do not. If so, hospitals that
treat more patients who receive specialised care might require top-up payments over and above their
PbR tariff income.
In our assessment we also take account of other factors that might explain costs. These factors
include the Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) to which the patient is assigned, various socio-
demographic, diagnostic and treatment-related characteristics of the patient, and the hospital in which
the patient is treated.
In what follows we first briefly set out the reasons why differential payments might be required for
specialised services. We then describe how we identify patients as having received specialised care,
assign costs to each patient record in HES, assess the costs of provider spells and decide upon an
analytical sample. We specify our multiple regression models before providing some descriptive
statistics comparing specialised to non-specialised activity. We then estimate models that investigate
the extent to which variations in cost are explained by whether or not a patient received a specialised
service.
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2. Payment by Results and specialised care
In April 2002 the Department of Health in England started to introduce a new system of hospital
reimbursement, called Payment by Results (PbR). Similarly to other healthcare systems, PbR uses a
fixed prospective payment that links a hospital’s income to the number and case mix of patients
treated. Under PbR, payments for hospital care are defined in terms of the healthcare resource group
(HRG – the English version of diagnosis related groups) to which each patient is allocated. Some
specialist hospitals in England are paid ‘top-up’ payments over and above their PbR income, with the
top-up calculated as a percentage of the relevant HRG tariff. In 2010/11 the top-up amounted to 78%
of the tariff for specialised children’s care and to 30% of the tariff for specialised orthopaedics services
(Department of Health, 2009).
England is not alone in making differential payments to specialist hospitals: such hospitals in other
countries with prospective payment also receive additional income over and above that which they
would receive from prospective payments alone (Mechanic et al., 1998, Langenbrunner and Wiley,
2002). However, if PbR is to promote efficiency and ensure value for money both the justification for
and size of the higher ‘top-up’ payments need to be established.
2.1 Specialisation ought to reduce costs
It is not immediately apparent why specialist hospitals should claim higher payments at all. The
practice seems to go against received economic wisdom dating back at least to Adam Smith’s
reflection on specialisation and comparative advantage: by specialising in specific types of activity,
providers should have lower costs than those providers that undertake a more diverse range of
activities. These lower costs are derived from two primary, though not exclusive, sources (Schneider
et al., 2008):
x Economies of scale, whereby the unit cost of treatment falls as volume increases, and
x Specialisation, where it is cheaper to concentrate on providing a limited rather than diverse
range of activities.
Most sectors of the economy have witnessed a move toward greater specialisation as providers have
sought comparative advantage (Essletzbicher, 2003). Similarly in healthcare over the past twenty
years the number of specialist orthopaedic, cardiac or general surgery hospitals in the United States
has grown from 29 in 1990 to 91 in 2005 (Shactman, 2005, Schneider et al., 2008). But in 2005 the
US government imposed a moratorium on further development, concerned primarily that such
hospitals were specialising merely on the most profitable procedures (Shactman, 2005). In contrast,
the English government has encouraged specialisation through the creation of treatment centres that
specialise in selected elective procedures such as hip or knee replacement or cataract removal, the
belief being that treatment centres are able to deliver care at lower cost than can be achieved by
hospitals (Department of Health, 2002).
If the argument that specialisation reduces costs holds in most other sectors of the economy, for
specialist hospitals in the United States and for treatment centres in England, why does if it not apply
to English specialist hospitals?
2.2 Patients receiving specialised care might have higher costs
The reason that the argument might not hold is that, compared to general hospitals, specialist
hospitals are treating different types of patients. If so, cost-reducing gains from specialisation might be
offset because specialist hospitals attract patients with more complex care requirements.
This potential problem arises because HRGs are imperfect measures of casemix: any system of
categorisation will inevitably combine patients with below and above average costs. This is not
problematic if there is little variation around the average and if the variation is random. But it would be
problematic if particular types of patients have significant higher costs than other patients allocated to
the same HRG. These particular patients may be those that require more expensive specialised care.
If HRGs fail to account for systematic differences between patients, the PbR price attached to the
HRG would be imperfect. Moreover, because patients receiving specialised care are more likely to be
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treated in specialist hospitals, the payment system would systematically disadvantage these hospitals.
The justification for specialist ‘top-up’ payments, then, is to correct potential imperfections in the HRG
classification system.
The objective of the analysis that follows, therefore, is to determine whether and the extent to which
patients who receive specialised care are more expensive than those allocated to the same HRG who
do not require specialised care.
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3. Data Issues
There are four major issues regarding the data that need to be addressed:
x How to determine whether or not a patient received specialised care;
x How to assign costs to each patient record in the Hospital Episode Statistics;
x How to determine the cost of a provider spell for those patients who have multiple consultant
episodes;
x How to arrive at an analytical sample.
3.1 Identifying whether a patient received specialised care
For each individual patient treated in an English hospital during 2008/9 we need to ascertain whether
or not specialised care was received. To do this we look at the routine information recorded in the
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) about every hospital patient treated during the financial year. Each
HES patient record includes a number of data ‘fields’, containing demographic (e.g. age, gender) and
clinical information (e.g. diagnosis, procedures performed).
Information in each patient’s diagnostic and procedural fields is examined to ascertain whether or not
specialised care was received. A patient is assigned a specialised care marker if:
x One of the ICD10 or OPCS codesa designated in the Specialised Services National Definition
Set (SSNDS) is present in their HES record (an individual might have more than one marker)
(NHS Specialised Services, 2010);
x They were treated at an eligible provider, because non-eligible providers should not be
providing specialised services.b
Specialised activity may not necessarily be more costly or complex, since the SSNDS defines activity
as specialised if it requires a planning population of over 1 million people, without any specific relation
to resource use.
3.2 Mapping of Reference Costs to HES records
Costs are not reported in HES. But all English hospitals have to report so-called ‘Reference Costs’ to
the English Department of Health about all of the patients they treat. We map the cost data from each
hospital’s Reference Costs to the data about each hospital’s patients recorded in HES.
In making their Reference Cost returns, hospitals report five pieces of cost information for each HRG
(h) in each of their specialties. So, for any given specialty, j, each hospital k will report:
x Average cost per day case in HRG h: dhjkc
x Average cost for elective patients in HRG h with a length of stay below the HRG-specific
trimpoint value: ehjkc
x Excess per diem cost for an elective patient in HRG h who stays in hospital beyond the HRG-
specific trimpoint: ehjkex
x Average cost for non-elective (including maternity, baby or a transfer) patients in HRG h with
a length of stay below HRG-specific trimpoint value: nhjkc
x Excess per diem cost for a non-elective patient in HRG h who stays in hospital beyond the
HRG-specific trimpoint nhjkex
a ICD10: International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision; OPCS: Office for
Population Censuses and Surveys Classification of Surgical Operations and Procedures
b In sensitivity analysis we relax this second condition.
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Trimpoints are defined for length of stay outliers in each HRG according to whether the patient was
admitted as an elective or non-elective. We define eht as the elective trimpoint in days and
n
ht as the
nonelective trimpoint for HRG h.
The costs provided by each hospital are assigned to each patient record in HES, according to
whether the patient was a day case ( )da , elective admission ( )ea or non-elective admission ( )na
and how long each patient stays in hospital, as follows:
x Day case: d dihjk hjkif a co
Elective with length of stay at or below the elective trimpoint: ( , )e e eihjk ihjk h hjkif a L t cd o
x
x Elective with length of stay above the elective trimpoint:
( , ) ( )
e e e e e
ihjk ihjk h hjk hjk ihjk h
if a L t c ex L tª º! o  u ¬ ¼
x Non-elective with length of stay at or below the non-elective trimpoint:
( , )
n n
ihjk ihjk h hjkif a L t cd o
x Non-elective with length of stay above the non-elective trimpoint:
( , ) ( )
e n n n n
ihjk ihjk h hjk hjk ihjk h
if a L t c ex L tª º! o  u ¬ ¼
3.3 Assessing the cost of provider spells
Each observation in HES comprises a Finished Consultant Episode (FCE, hereafter “episode”),
measuring the time the patient spends under the care of a particular consultant. Similarly hospitals
report their costs on the basis of episodes.
Around 90% of patients remain under the care of a single consultant during their entire hospital stay.
The remainder are cared for by more than one consultant, most usually because they are transferred
from one specialty to another. We can track the episodes pertaining to each individual patient,
allowing us to construct a Provider Spell for each patient, measuring the time from admission to
discharge. By linking successive episodes for each patient, we are able to take account of the
information in all of the records for those patients with multiple episodes.
Multi-episode spells are likely to be more costly than single-episode spells, but there is no agreed
method for determining the additional cost. This is important for our analysis because patients who
receive specialised care are more likely to have multi-episode spells. In the absence of an agreed
methodology we assess the sensitivity our results to three means of determining the cost of multi-
episode provider spells:
x SUM: the cost of the provider spell is equivalent to the sum of the costs of each episode in the
spell;
x MAX: the cost of the provider spell is equivalent to the most expensive episode in the spell;
x EPI1: the cost of the provider spell is equivalent to the first episode in the spell.
Table 1: Mean (SD) costs by type of activity (£)
Not specialised Specialised Total
Sum 1,385 1,884 1,436
(2,079) (3,790) (2,320)
Max 1,219 1,673 1,265
(1,730) (3,210) (1,940)
Epi1 1,142 1,540 1,183
(1,587) (2,929) (1,777)
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Summary statistics of the costs calculated in each of the three ways are provided in Table 1 for all
patients treated in 2008/9 and according to whether or not they received specialised care. As would
be expected there are differences among the three ways of computing spell costs but these are not
particularly marked because 90% of spells are single-episode.
Irrespective of the way in which costs are calculated, there are clear differences in costs between
patients who do and do not receive specialised care. This raises the question of what drives these
differences in cost.
3.4 Selection of the analytical sample
From an initial sample of 17.4m HES episodes, our analytical sample is reduced to 13.5m episodes
(and 12m spells) for the following reasons:
x We consider only those patients treated in NHS acute hospitals. Hence, patients treated in
mental health, ambulance and primary care trusts and private providers are excluded;
x HES episodes with missing identifier codes (epikey) are dropped, because they cannot be
matched to the Reference Cost database;
x We exclude duplicate observations and those showing data inconsistencies, such as
admission date posterior to discharge or patients with different ethnicity codes within a spell;
x Reference costs are not reported comprehensively for some types of activity, notably renal
dialysis, well babies, mental health, and cystic fibrosis. Details are providing in Appendix
Tables A1 and A2;
x The Reference Costs for some hospitals were not provided in a form that allowed them to be
matched to HES records.c For all hospitals the numbers of provider spells with unmatched
costs are reported in Appendix Table A3 and as a proportion of total activity in Appendix
Table A4;
x We excluded those episodes with a length of stay in excess of 365 days.
In Table 2 we report how we reduced the full HES dataset to our analytical sample.
Table 2: Eligibility and selection criterion
Step # episodes # episodes dropped
Starting observations 17,411,542
Acute care trusts only 425,179
16,986,363
Missing epikey 5,843
16,980,520
Duplicates and inconsistent coding 846,483
16,134,037
HRG4 missing link 144,822
15,989,215
Unmatched reference cost 2,357,777
13,631,438
Unmatched trimpoint and excess bed days 79
13,631,359
Zero cost per episode day 57,599
Total episodes 13,573,760 3,837,782
Total spells 12,154,599
c This was particularly so for South London Healthcare Trust (RYQ), which may be due to its recent creation as an
amalgamation of three smaller hospitals; Western Sussex Hospital NHS Trust (RYR), which may also be due to its recent
creation as a merger of the Royal West Sussex and Worthing & Southlands Hospitals; and Cambridge University Hospitals
NHS Foundation Trust (RGT).
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4. Estimation models
The analytical purpose is to examine the extent to which patients who receive specialised care have
different costs to other patients allocated to the same HRG. This requires careful construction of the
dependent variable.
First, we adjust reported costs by Market Forces Factor (MFF) of the hospital in which the patient was
treated. The MFF is an index of geographical variation in the prices of land, buildings, and labour
(Department of Health, 2008) and is designed to capture unavoidable factor price differentials that
impact on the actual costs incurred by hospitals in producing healthcare services. By adjusting for
MFF, we wash out these unavoidable differentials in costs across hospitals.
Second, there are significant estimation problems when comparing jointly the overall population of
some 12m patients, who receive very diverse types of treatment. It would be unfeasible to include
dummy variables for all 1,400 HRGs as these would introduce incidental parameter biases. To
overcome the need to include dummy variables, we instead standardize each patient’s cost by the
mean cost of all other patients allocated to the same HRG. Thus our dependent variable is defined as
the patient’s cost standardised to the average cost of patients in the same HRG: ݕ௜௞ = ܿ௜௛௞ ܿ௛ෝൗ whereܿ௜௛௞ is the cost of patient i in HRG h in hospital k and ܿ௛ෝ is the national average cost of all patients
allocated to HRG h.
We then need to ascertain why the costs of patients allocated to the same HRG differ. Other than
simple random variation, there are three main possibilities:
1. Some patients receive specialised care while others do not;
2. Some hospitals are more cost-efficient than others;
3. Some patients may have cost-driving characteristics not allowed for completely in the
construction of HRGs.
We construct four different multiple regression models designed to determine the extent to which the
above possibilities explain variation in costs.
Our base model simply regresses each patient’s standardised cost against the full set (n=1…N) of
specialised care markers (S), which take the form of dummy variables. The model is specified as:ݕ௜ ൌן ൅σ ߚ௡ܵ௡௜ ൅ ߝ௜ே௡ୀଵ (equation 1)
Where the ߚƍݏ are the parameters of interest: if positive and significant, a patient with the specialist
care marker has higher costs than do other patients allocated to the same HRG. ߝ௜ captures random
error, which is assumed to be normally distributed. Much of the actual variation in costs from one
patient to another is unobservable, so the explanatory power of equation 1 (and the models that
follow) will be low, as indicated by the R2 statistic. This is not surprising given that the purpose of the
model is not to explain exactly why costs vary from one patient to another. There will be many
individual and idiosyncratic reasons driving each individual’s costs, hence making them virtually
impossible to observe. Rather the purpose is to assess what influence various specific identified
factors, most importantly the specialist markers, have in explaining costs. In this base model we
assume that the myriad unidentified reasons are randomly distributed among patients and hospitals,
with their influence being captured by the random error term. This assumption is relaxed in the other
models.
In interpreting the results, note that the coefficients on specialised markers, the ߚƍݏ, represent the
difference in standardised costs between patients who do and do not receive specialised services. In
fact, if we think about expectations, since we are assuming the zero mean conditional assumptionܧ(ݕ௜| ௜ܵ ǡ ࡿǡ ࢄ) = 0, then ߚ௡ ൌ ܧ(ݕ௜| ௜ܵ ൌ ͳǡ ࡿǡ ࢄ)െ ܧ(ݕ௜| ௜ܵ ൌ Ͳǡ ࡿǡ ࢄ). In order to get a more easily
interpretable measure like the percentage increase in costs associated with receipt of specialised
care, gn, we need to compute the marginal mean for unspecialised services, so that:
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݃௡ = ܧ(ݕ௜| ௜ܵ ൌ ͳǡ ࡿǡ ࢄ)െ ܧ(ݕ௜| ௜ܵ ൌ Ͳǡ ࡿǡࢄ)ܧ(ݕ௜| ௜ܵ ൌ Ͳǡ ࡿǡ ࢄ) כ ͳͲͲ
Costs may vary from one patient to another because of the hospital in which they are treated. Our
second model explores this possibility. To do so, equation 1 is estimated as a random effects modeldݕ௜௞ ൌן ൅σ ߚ௡ܵ௡௜௞ ൅ ݑ௞ ൅ ݒ௜௞ே௡ୀଵ (equation 2)
Equation 2 thus recognises the multi-level structure of the dataset, with patients (i=1…I) clustered
within hospitals (k=1…K). The ݑ௞ is the random effect. This captures the effect of the hospital on the
cost of any particular patient treated in the hospital over and above the other explanatory variables
included in the model (here, whether and what type of specialised care the patient received). Provided
some assumptions are satisfied (which we’ll come to) the random effect can be interpreted as a
measure of relative hospital performance in controlling costs or, in other words, of relative hospital
efficiency. Due to the grouped nature of the data, we estimate standard errors clustered by hospital,
capturing the intra-class correlation in the error term ݒ௜௞.
This second equation is the preferred model on which top-up payments should be based, this model
accounting for the clustering of patients within hospitals but ignoring other patient characteristics that
may not be adequately captured by the HRG to which the patient is allocated.
While accounting for the hospital in which they are treated, equation 2 includes only the specialised
care markers to explain why the costs of any individual patient might differ from the costs of other
patients allocated to the same HRG. In reality, of course, an individual’s costs will vary because of
other characteristics than merely whether or not they received specialised care and the hospital in
which they are treated. To some extent the HRG to which the patient is allocated accounts for these
characteristics, but HRGs can only do this imperfectly. There will always be imprecision in the way
that patients are categorised to a limited set of HRGs, with some patients having higher or lower costs
than others categorised to the same HRG. If the characteristics that might explain an individual’s cost
are imperfectly accounted for in the construction of HRGs and are not included as explanatory
variables in the regression model, their omission might lead to two problems:
x First, the influence of the explanatory variables that are included in the model might be
biased. Here this would imply that the estimated influence on cost of whether or not a patient
receives specialised care would be imprecise. The influence of specialised care would be
over-estimated if the omitted variables are both cost-increasing and positively correlated with
receipt of specialised care. This might be the case, for instance, for patients with more
complex diagnoses than typical for other patients in their HRG. If these diagnostic
characteristics were also included in the model, the result would be a lower estimated
influence of specialised care on cost.
x Second, the estimated hospital (random) effects might be biased and, if so, would provide an
imperfect measure of relative hospital efficiency. This bias would arise if there are systematic
differences across hospitals in the type of patients treated within each particular HRG. For
instance, one hospital might attract more complex patients with more diagnostic problems. If
this is not taken into account the hospital will appear to have higher costs than it should have
given the (inaccurately measured) profile of the patients that it treats.
The solution to both problems is, of course, to take these characteristics into account by including
them as explanatory variables in the model. In our third model we consider the extent to which patient
characteristics, over and above whether they have received specialised services, explain costs. To do
this, we include a set (m=1…M) of additional explanatory variables (X) describing each patient:ݕ௜ ൌן ൅σ ߚ௡ܵ௡௜ + σ ߛ௠ܺ௠௜ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜ே௡ୀଵ (equation 3)
d We estimated also a fixed effects specification and compared the models by Hausman tests. The difference in coefficients is
not statistically significant, which is not surprising, given the large amount of observations per hospital. The random effects
model is preferred as it is more efficient.
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The choice of what variables to take account of is, of course, constrained by the available data. The
variables we include to describe patient characteristics are derived from information contained in each
of the HES records comprising the provider spell for each individual patient. We construct a series of
variables measuring the following:
x The socio-economic conditions of the area in which the patient is resident (variables labelled
“imd*”);
x The presence of various diagnostic markers that may influence cost over and above the HRG
to which the patient is allocated and whether or not they receive specialised care. These
markers depend on the presence of specific ICD10 or OPCS codes in the HES record and
include such things as hypertension, allergies, obesity, diabetes, and history of past disease;
x Whether a patient was transferred into the hospital or is transferred to another hospital, and
whether the hospitals in question were eligible or non-eligible providers of specialist services
(labelled “tr_*”);
x Whether the patient died;
x Whether the patient was admitted as an emergency;
x The number of episodes comprising the patient’s provider spell;
x Regional and urban location of the hospital;
x Whether the patient was white;
x The patient’s age and gender (and interactions of these).
Our fourth model allows for whether or not a patient received specialised care, for the other patient
characteristics that might explain costs and for clustering of patients within each hospital. Estimated
as a random effects model, this model takes the general form:ݕ௜௞ ൌן ൅σ ߚ௡ܵ௡௜௞ + σ ߛ௠ܺ௠௜௞ ൅ ݑ௞ +ெ௠ୀଵ ݒ௜௞ே௡ୀଵ (equation 4)
The random effect from this fourth model is the basis on which judgements about the relative cost
efficiency of hospitals should be made. The random effects from this model are purged of the
influence on costs of whether or not patients received specialised care and of their other
characteristics. Patients treated in hospitals with higher random effects have higher costs than
elsewhere. These higher costs are not due to the type or characteristics of these patients being
treated.
We conduct various sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of, firstly, the estimates of the
additional cost implications of whether or not the patient received specialised care and, secondly, of
the relative cost efficiency of individual hospitals. Specifically we investigate whether:
x Results are robust to the four formulations of the regression model as set out in equations 1
to 4;
x Results are robust to estimating the model with the dependent variable in linear or logarithmic
form and to employing a generalised linear modele;
x Results depend on how the cost of the patient spell is determined;
x Results are dependent on whether patients are defined as receiving specialised care only if
they are treated in eligible providers;
x The majority of HRGs comprise a mix of patients who do and do not receive specialised care.
However, for some HRGs virtually everyone classified to them received specialised care; for
other HRGs virtually no-one did. We assess whether results are sensitive to whether or not
patients allocated to these HRGs are included in the analysis.
e The generalised linear model would be the preferred specification but the random effects models (equations 2 and 4) could
not be estimated using this form.
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5. Descriptive statistics
In 2008/09, for approximately 1.5m (12.5%) of patients it was indicated that some kind of specialised
activity was delivered as part of the treatment package. Table 3 reports the number of patients with
particular conditions who receive specialised services, and shows that, for instance, 360,000 patients
received renal care specialised services. For the vast majority of patients, just one specialised service
was delivered but around 30,000 patients received more than one specialised service.
Table 3: number of spells receiving specialised services
Service # Service #
Cancer 14,035 Dermatology 10,790
BMT 1,050 Rheumatology 358
Haemophilia 146 Endocrinology 7,028
Women 22,551 Respiratory 71,824
Spinal 2,167 Vascular diseases 801
Neurosciences 23,848 Pain Management 753
Cystic fibrosis 91,868 Ear surgery 1,704
Renal 360,957 Colorectal 6,838
Intestinal failure 2,380 Orthopaedic 3,671
Cardiology 89,127 Morbid obesity 7,905
Cleft lip 222,939 Metabolic disorders 3,182
Infectious diseases 2,203 Ophthalmology 6,345
Liver 14,807 Haemoglobinopathy 146,403
Children 104,764 More than 1 service 32,311
Some organizations are or have been eligible for top-up payments for some specialised services. We
can see from Table 4 that, as would be expected, hospitals which are or have been eligible for top-
ups now or in the past undertake more specialised spells than do other hospitals. The difference can
be quite marked, as in the case of specialised neurosciences services, where the list of eligible
providers treated ten times the number of patients treated by non eligible providers. The proportion of
patients receiving specialised services varies considerably among providers (see Appendix Table A4).
Overall 12% of patients received specialised services, but the proportion of an individual provider’s
activity ranged 0.5% to almost 69% (at Papworth).
Table 4: Specialised spells by eligibility
Specialised spells (%) Specialised spells (%)
Spinal Not eligible 0.029 Liver Not eligible 0.234
Eligible 0.098 Eligible 0.417
Neurosciences Not eligible 0.085 Children Not eligible 1.200
Eligible 0.862 Eligible 3.430
Cardiology Not eligible 0.445 Respiratory Not eligible 1.483
Eligible 2.778 Eligible 2.300
In Table 5 we provide some descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the right-hand
side of equations 3 and 4. Patients receiving specialised services are more likely to be male, younger
(probably mainly because infants are more likely to require specialised activity, 16% of them at birth),
have fewer multi-episode spells, and to have been transferred between hospitals. Some of the
patients’ characteristics were constructed by referring to ICD10 codes, so there might be some
overlap with the diagnostic markers used for the definition of specialised services. However, other
than a very small correlation between obesity and morbid obesity services, we found no correlation
between the specialised markers and the patients’ characteristics.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (st.dev. in parenthesis)
NOT SPEC SPEC TOT
NOT
SPEC SPEC TOT
female 0.574 0.445 0.560 alcohol 0.0170 0.00732 0.0160
(0.495) (0.497) (0.496) (0.129) (0.0852) (0.125)
age 51.61 49.94 51.44 smoke 0.0369 0.0348 0.0367
(24.24) (25.70) (24.40) (0.189) (0.183) (0.188)
urban 0.818 0.817 0.818 obesity 0.00720 0.0140 0.00791
(0.386) (0.387) (0.386) (0.0845) (0.118) (0.0886)
episodes 1.118 1.108 1.117 allergy 0.0276 0.0191 0.0267
(0.426) (0.545) (0.440) (0.164) (0.137) (0.161)
emerg 0.383 0.159 0.360 diabetes 0.0785 0.0626 0.0769
(0.486) (0.366) (0.480) (0.269) (0.242) (0.266)
die 0.0155 0.0181 0.0158 hypertens 0.171 0.121 0.165
(0.124) (0.133) (0.125) (0.376) (0.326) (0.372)
tr_in_eli 0.0000394 0.000164 0.0000522 haemorr 0.00393 0.00899 0.00445
(0.00628) (0.0128) (0.00723) (0.0626) (0.0944) (0.0666)
tr_in_noneli 0.0265 0.0414 0.0280 histdis 0.108 0.0866 0.106
(0.161) (0.199) (0.165) (0.310) (0.281) (0.307)
tr_out_eli 0.00501 0.00491 0.00500 riskfact 0.00729 0.00265 0.00681
(0.0706) (0.0699) (0.0705) (0.0851) (0.0514) (0.0822)
tr_out_noneli 0.0113 0.0135 0.0116 congmalf 0.0113 0.0487 0.0151
(0.106) (0.115) (0.107) (0.106) (0.215) (0.122)
pregnancy 0.104 0.00528 0.0941 risk_phys 0.000643 0.00119 0.000700
(0.306) (0.0725) (0.292) (0.0254) (0.0345) (0.0265)
drug 0.00324 0.00203 0.00312 risk_psysoc 0.00384 0.00157 0.00361
(0.0568) (0.0450) (0.0557) (0.0619) (0.0395) (0.0600)
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6. Results
We have estimated various equations and explored the sensitivity of estimates to a range of
modelling choices. The specialised markers where estimates are statistically significant appear in bold
if p<0.001 and in italics if p<0.05. Rather than reporting the coefficients, we report the predicted
percentage increase in costs for specialised services, gn, calculated as described previously. The full
regression results for equation 4 are reported in Appendix Table A5.
In our main analysis we present estimates for the four estimated equations and compare results when
applying different functional forms, namely linear, logarithmic and generalised linear models. In all of
these analyses, the cost of a provider spell is calculated as the sum of the cost of the constituent
episodes and each patient is assigned a specialist marker if one of the SSNDS ICD10 and OPCS
codes appears in their record and they were treated as an eligible provider.
We consider the sensitivity of these estimates to choices about how the costs of provider spells are
calculated, to dropping the requirement that specialised care is defined as being provided in eligible
providers only, and to exclusion from the analysis of patients in particular HRGs.
6.1 Estimates across equations and by functional form
Table 6 presents results from the four equations, going from the base specification which includes the
dummies for specialised services only (equation 1), two intermediate models (equations 2 and 3) and
the full model with patients’ characteristics and hospital random effects (equation 4). These equations
are estimated with the dependent variable in both linear and logarithmic form. Equations 1 and 3 are
also estimated as generalised linear models (GLM), assuming a gamma distribution with a log link. It
was not possible to estimate equations 2 and 4 by applying GLM methods, the models failing to
converge because of the size and heterogeneity of the data and the complexity of GLM methods.
In considering the results, there are some general issues to note.
x The level of significance for most specialist markers tends to be consistent across equations
and whether estimated in linear, logarithmic or generalised linear form. This means that we
can be confident in interpreting (i) a significant (p<0.001) positive coefficient as indicating that
the specialist marker has a significant positive impact on cost and (ii) a non-significant
coefficient as indicating no significant impact of the marker on costs. Thus, for most specialist
markers, significance is not due to incorrect model specification.
x For equations 1 and 3, the linear and generalised linear estimates are very similar. The
estimates from the logarithmic models differ, but not in a consistent direction – sometimes the
estimates are higher (eg spinal and rheumatology), sometimes lower (eg children, colorectal).
x The size of the estimates is lower in the full specification (equation 4) than in the base model
(equation 1). The difference is due to the fact that full specification includes patient
characteristics and hospital effects and their inclusion partially purges the effect of specialised
services.
x The significance level for cardiology varies according to model specification. In the linear form
of equation 1 and in every log specification, cardiology patients who receive specialised care
are found to have significantly higher costs than those who do not. In the other linear models,
the predicted effects are not significant. These unstable results may be due to the
construction of cardiology HRGs, whereby many are populated almost entirely by patients
who received a specialised service. This is particularly true for patients receiving coronary
artery bypass grafts, valve procedures, and percutaneous coronary interventions. We explore
the implications of omitting HRGs such as these in section 6.4.
x For infectious diseases and vascular services, the specialist markers are significant in (some
of) the linear models but insignificant in the log models. This instability may be due to the
relatively small number of patients classified as having these specialised services.
As indicated earlier, we recommend equation 2 as the basis for determining the size of the mark-up
on specialist services, should the estimate be statistically significant. In the case of every specialised
marker the predicted effects are larger in equation 1 than in equation 2. This is because equation 1
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Table 6: Estimates of additional costs associated with receipt of specialised care
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ1 EQ3
Cancer 0.2173 0.1842 0.2168 0.1879 0.1445 0.1320 0.1459 0.1339 0.2159 0.2138
BMT -0.0551 -0.1045 -0.0499 -0.0897 -0.0178 -0.0331 -0.0126 -0.0240 -0.0389 -0.0251
Haemophilia -0.0886 -0.1435 -0.1839 -0.2022 -0.1593 -0.1644 -0.1139 -0.1060 -0.0895 -0.1506
Womens -0.0031 -0.0192 -0.0071 -0.0157 0.0310 0.0183 0.0214 0.0170 -0.0024 -0.0020
Spinal 0.3231 0.2755 0.3043 0.2729 0.3982 0.3117 0.3691 0.2932 0.3153 0.2926
Neurosciences 0.2791 0.2286 0.2051 0.1691 0.2490 0.2448 0.2002 0.1962 0.2747 0.2055
CysticFibrosis 0.3965 0.3792 0.3499 0.3347 0.2694 0.2580 0.2113 0.1984 0.3927 0.3358
Renal -0.1118 -0.1117 -0.0803 -0.0868 0.0127 0.0150 0.0357 0.0360 -0.1136 -0.0871
IntestinalFailure -0.0074 0.0017 -0.0253 -0.0196 0.0715 0.0732 0.0453 0.0465 -0.0050 -0.0223
Cardiology 0.1382 0.0007 0.0567 -0.0600 0.2625 0.1976 0.1875 0.1287 0.1374 0.0611
CleftLip -0.0171 -0.0423 -0.0032 -0.0144 0.0161 0.0026 0.0099 0.0033 -0.0180 0.0032
InfectiousDiseaes 0.2644 0.2129 0.2312 0.2049 -0.0365 -0.0669 -0.0594 -0.0808 0.2432 0.2005
Liver 0.0978 0.0754 0.0809 0.0637 0.0529 0.0442 0.0294 0.0293 0.0980 0.0774
Children 0.2804 0.1997 0.2524 0.1742 0.1748 0.1457 0.1158 0.0911 0.2775 0.2414
Dermatology 0.0087 -0.0087 0.0135 -0.0037 -0.0658 -0.0715 -0.0638 -0.0707 0.0086 0.0162
Rheumatology 0.1827 0.1298 0.2019 0.1618 0.3332 0.2477 0.3503 0.2720 0.1840 0.2178
Endocrinology 0.0451 -0.0071 0.0517 0.0110 0.0404 0.0094 0.0451 0.0196 0.0422 0.0517
Respiratory 0.0458 -0.0381 -0.0059 -0.0743 -0.0905 -0.1214 -0.1322 -0.1518 0.0414 -0.0123
VascularDiseases 0.2461 0.2112 0.1981 0.1753 0.1269 0.1015 0.0812 0.0593 0.2340 0.1777
PainManagement 0.1878 0.1902 0.2278 0.2200 -0.2563 -0.2100 -0.2315 -0.1965 0.1645 0.2322
EarSurgery 0.0570 -0.0006 0.0847 0.0183 0.0794 0.0441 0.0995 0.0555 0.0574 0.0872
Colorectal 0.2136 0.2105 0.2181 0.2150 0.1758 0.1813 0.1720 0.1791 0.2129 0.2212
Orthopaedic 0.2443 0.2130 0.2581 0.2248 0.2550 0.1997 0.2925 0.2283 0.2382 0.2546
MorbidObesity -0.0268 -0.0075 -0.0438 -0.0106 0.0271 0.0329 -0.0100 0.0157 -0.0265 -0.0412
MetabolicDisorders 0.0215 -0.0155 0.0506 0.0023 -0.3371 -0.3043 -0.3252 -0.3039 0.0144 0.0258
Ophthalmology 0.0800 0.0570 0.0923 0.0784 0.1194 0.0741 0.1327 0.0923 0.0770 0.0993
Haemoglobinopathy 0.0128 0.0031 0.0140 0.0131 -0.1042 -0.1112 -0.0998 -0.1013 0.0100 0.0025
N 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599
R2 / Log-pseudolikelihood 0.0022 0.0020 0.0088 0.0080 0.0033 0.0032 0.0266 0.0257 -11831417 -11777757
R2within 0.0017 0.0058 0.0028 0.0240
R2 between 0.1656 0.1029 0.1283 0.0668
RHO 0.0239 0.0169 0.0402 0.0331
Generalised linear
modelsLinear models Logarithmicmodels
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ignores the influence on costs associated with the hospital in which care was delivered and,
consequently, this specification risks over-estimating the impact of the receipt of specialised services
on an individual’s cost.
x For the colorectal specialist marker the difference between the estimates is negligible. This
implies that the higher costs observed for patients who receive specialised colorectal care are
not due to the hospital in which they were treated. This would suggest that, for these services,
there is little variation among hospitals in the costs of specialised care for these types of
patients.
x For other types of treatment, though, the predicted effects differ more markedly, most
obviously for spinal, children’s and rheumatology specialised services. The differences imply
that higher costs are not due solely to whether the patient received specialised services but
are also related to the hospital that provided the care. It could be that some hospitals
systematically attract more patients with other characteristics that explain higher costs; it
could be that these hospitals exert less cost control and are less efficient. Consideration of
the other specifications will help disentangle these explanations.
We first consider the former possibility that other patient characteristics explain variation in costs.
Compare equation 1 with equation 3, both of which ignore the clustering of patients within hospitals.
This comparison allows us to assess what impact there might be on the specialised markers of taking
into account other patient characteristics that might explain costs. Again concentrating only on those
specialist markers that are significant, three patterns emerge:
x For some specialist markers there is very little difference between the two estimates. This is
the case for the cancer and colorectal markers and implies that patient characteristics do not
explain variation in patient costs over and above the influence of the specialist marker.
x For other specialist markers the estimates in equation 3 are lower than those from equation 1.
This is so for spinal, neurosciences, cystic fibrosis and children’s specialist services. The
differences are because patients receiving these types of specialist care also have other
characteristics that drive their higher costs. Equation 1 ignored these characteristics and,
consequently, their influence was partially captured by the specialist markers.
x In contrast, the estimates for some markers are higher in equation 3 than in equation 1, as
seen for rheumatology and orthopaedic specialist markers. This implies a negative correlation
between receipt of these specialised services and those patient characteristics that drive
costs. At first sight this might seem surprising but consider again the descriptive statistics for
these characteristics reported in Table 5. Those who received specialised services are not
always more likely than those who did not to have the potentially cost increasing
characteristics.
6.2 Sensitivity to calculation of the cost of provider spells
There is no correct way of calculating the cost of a provider spell composed of multiple episodes. For
the results presented thus far the cost of the spell is calculated as the sum of the consistent episodes
recorded for each patient (SUM). The spell cost could instead be based on the highest episode cost
(MAX) or the first episode in the spell (EPI1). We examine what impact this might have on the results
by considering the linear form of equation 2, this being chosen because the estimates from the linear
specification are very similar to the preferred but un-estimable generalised linear model.
As Table 7 shows, the significance of the estimates does not depend on the calculation, though
significance is reduced for vascular diseases when spell costs are based on the highest episode cost
(Max).
The size of the estimates varies according to the specialist marker, but usually by less than 2%.
There is, however, a difference of 8.3% for cystic fibrosis and a 5.4% difference for vascular diseases.
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Table 7: Sensitivity of estimates to calculation of the cost of provider spells
6.3 Sensitivity to considering specialist care in non-eligible hospitals
As a further sensitivity analysis we assess the impact of allowing for the eligibility of the provider on
the results. For the results considered thus far a patient was defined as receiving specialised care if
one of the SSNDS ICD10 or OPCS codes was present in their medical record and they were treated
as an eligible provider. In Table 8 we re-present the effects for the specialist markers followed by the
effects generated after relaxing the condition that specialised services have to be delivered by eligible
providers. Both sets of results are derived from the linear specification.
Again concentrating only on the specialist markers that are statistically significant, there are two types
of impact:
x For some specialist markers, the effect is not sensitive to whether or not specialised care is
defined as being confined to eligible providers. This is the case for the cancer, cystic fibrosis,
infectious diseases, rheumatology, colorectal and orthopaedic markers.
x For other markers, the effect on costs of having received specialised care is lower if this care
is recognised as having been delivered by non-eligible providers. This is the case for spinal,
neurosciences and children’s specialised care.
Sum Max Epi1
Cancer 0.1842 0.1773 0.1935
BMT -0.1045 -0.1440 -0.0083
Haemophilia -0.1435 -0.1507 -0.1199
Womens -0.0192 -0.0337 -0.0136
Spinal 0.2755 0.2618 0.2734
Neurosciences 0.2286 0.2166 0.2346
CysticFibrosis 0.3792 0.4314 0.3486
Renal -0.1117 -0.1303 -0.0995
IntestinalFailure 0.0017 -0.0220 0.0054
Cardiology 0.0007 -0.0157 0.0405
CleftLip -0.0423 -0.0577 -0.0340
InfectiousDiseaes 0.2129 0.2375 0.2035
Liver 0.0754 0.0738 0.0763
Children 0.1997 0.1920 0.2118
Dermatology -0.0087 -0.0204 0.0003
Rheumatology 0.1298 0.1147 0.1391
Endocrinology -0.0071 -0.0106 -0.0061
Respiratory -0.0381 -0.0031 -0.0566
VascularDiseases 0.2112 0.1976 0.2517
PainManagement 0.1902 0.1742 0.1976
EarSurgery -0.0006 -0.0173 0.0106
Colorectal 0.2105 0.2069 0.2140
Orthopaedic 0.2130 0.2026 0.2179
MorbidObesity -0.0075 -0.0293 0.0063
MetabolicDisorders -0.0155 -0.0250 -0.0136
Ophthalmology 0.0570 0.0451 0.0629
Haemoglobinopathy 0.0031 -0.0079 0.0139
N 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599
R2 0.0020 0.0023 0.0019
R2within 0.0017 0.0020 0.0015
R2between 0.1656 0.1566 0.1860
RHO 0.0239 0.0223 0.0239
Linearmodel - Equation 2
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Table 8: Sensitivity of estimates to recognition of specialised services by non-eligible providers
6.4 Sensitivity to exclusion of patients in particular HRGs
Some HRGs are almost exclusively populated by patients who received specialised services.
Similarly, there are some HRGs in which no patients received specialised services. The former type of
HRG arises because the ICD10 or OPCS codes used to indicate the receipt of specialised care
sometimes also serve to indicate the HRG to which patients should be allocated.f Including patients
allocated to these HRGs in the analysis may bias the estimated effect on costs of the specialist
markers. This is because for the HRGs in which all patients receive specialised care there is no
comparative reference group that consists of patients allocated to the same HRG who did not receive
specialised care. We assess the impact on the estimated effects of excluding patients allocated to
these HRGs from the analysis. We define three categories for exclusion:
x Dropping patients in those HRGs in which everyone is identified as having received
specialised care and those HRGs in which no-one is identified as having received specialised
care (TRIM1). This reduces the analytical sample by 2.1% (256,517 patients).
f As noted earlier, this is particularly true for patients receiving cardiac care, although the coefficient for the cardiology specialist
marker is significant only under the linear form of equation 1.
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4
Cancer 0.2173 0.1842 0.2168 0.1879 0.2185 0.1845 0.2169 0.1876
BMT -0.0551 -0.1045 -0.0499 -0.0897 -0.0469 -0.1006 -0.0436 -0.0870
Haemophilia -0.0886 -0.1435 -0.1839 -0.2022 -0.0889 -0.1437 -0.1857 -0.2028
Womens -0.0031 -0.0192 -0.0071 -0.0157 -0.0026 -0.0192 -0.0093 -0.0174
Spinal 0.3231 0.2755 0.3043 0.2729 0.1950 0.1738 0.1931 0.1813
Neurosciences 0.2791 0.2286 0.2051 0.1691 0.2293 0.1893 0.1713 0.1472
CysticFibrosis 0.3965 0.3792 0.3499 0.3347 0.3981 0.3783 0.3536 0.3366
Renal -0.1118 -0.1117 -0.0803 -0.0868 -0.1120 -0.1126 -0.0816 -0.0882
IntestinalFailure -0.0074 0.0017 -0.0253 -0.0196 -0.0086 0.0015 -0.0261 -0.0198
Cardiology 0.1382 0.0007 0.0567 -0.0600 0.0795 -0.0116 0.0103 -0.0673
CleftLip -0.0171 -0.0423 -0.0032 -0.0144 -0.0180 -0.0433 -0.0060 -0.0157
InfectiousDiseaes 0.2644 0.2129 0.2312 0.2049 0.2654 0.2116 0.2299 0.2029
Liver 0.0978 0.0754 0.0809 0.0637 0.0640 0.0693 0.0462 0.0551
Children 0.2804 0.1997 0.2524 0.1742 0.1311 0.0879 0.1032 0.0711
Dermatology 0.0087 -0.0087 0.0135 -0.0037 0.0114 -0.0097 0.0121 -0.0064
Rheumatology 0.1827 0.1298 0.2019 0.1618 0.1821 0.1270 0.1995 0.1583
Endocrinology 0.0451 -0.0071 0.0517 0.0110 0.0456 -0.0072 0.0511 0.0106
Respiratory 0.0458 -0.0381 -0.0059 -0.0743 0.0269 0.0063 -0.0299 -0.0452
VascularDiseases 0.2461 0.2112 0.1981 0.1753 0.2618 0.2112 0.2050 0.1717
PainManagement 0.1878 0.1902 0.2278 0.2200 0.1853 0.1871 0.2247 0.2169
EarSurgery 0.0570 -0.0006 0.0847 0.0183 0.0610 -0.0008 0.0852 0.0164
Colorectal 0.2136 0.2105 0.2181 0.2150 0.2119 0.2090 0.2159 0.2130
Orthopaedic 0.2443 0.2130 0.2581 0.2248 0.2469 0.2144 0.2579 0.2246
MorbidObesity -0.0268 -0.0075 -0.0438 -0.0106 -0.0273 -0.0085 -0.0467 -0.0122
MetabolicDisorders 0.0215 -0.0155 0.0506 0.0023 0.0233 -0.0205 0.0499 -0.0026
Ophthalmology 0.0800 0.0570 0.0923 0.0784 0.0797 0.0564 0.0908 0.0771
Haemoglobinopathy 0.0128 0.0031 0.0140 0.0131 0.0131 0.0034 0.0141 0.0130
N 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599 12,154,599
R2 0.0022 0.0020 0.0088 0.0080 0.0018 0.0017 0.0085 0.0078
R2within 0.0017 0.0058 0.0015 0.0057
R2 between 0.1656 0.1029 0.1310 0.0851
RHO 0.0239 0.0169 0.0236 0.0157
Linear models, specialised care in eligible
hospitals only
Linearmodels, specialised care in any hospital
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x Dropping patients in those HRGs in which there are fewer than 10 patients who did not
receive specialised care and those HRGs in which there are fewer than 10 patients who did
receive specialised care (TRIM2). This reduces the analytical sample by 7.4% (877,285
patients).
x Dropping patients in those HRGs in which more than 99% of patients or less than 1% are
identified as having receiving specialised care (TRIM3). This has a dramatic effect on the
analytical sample, reducing it by 52.6% (5,933,359 patients).
Results are presented in Table 9, again for the linear form of equation 2. To summarise:
x The predicted effects are not sensitive to the first method of exclusion (TRIM1), except for the
specialist marker for bone marrow transplantation, which is now significant, and for vascular
diseases, which increases from 21% to 28%.
x Compared to the original estimates, the predicted effects increase when applying the second
and third methods of exclusion (TRIM2 and TRIM3) for the following markers: bone marrow
transplantation, spinal, neurosciences, and vascular diseases. For the rheumatology and
colorectal markers, the effects are now insignificant. The effects for the other markers are not
substantially changed.
Table 9: Sensitivity of estimates to exclusion of particular HRGs
Full Trim1 Trim 2 Trim3
Cancer 0.1842 0.1822 0.1820 0.1828
BMT -0.1045 0.1637 0.1663 0.1860
Haemophilia -0.1435 -0.1452 -0.1464 -0.2113
Womens -0.0192 -0.0207 -0.0175 -0.0316
Spinal 0.2755 0.2729 0.3374 0.4262
Neurosciences 0.2286 0.2267 0.2907 0.3076
CysticFibrosis 0.3792 0.3861 0.3860 0.3693
Renal -0.1117 -0.1152 -0.1171 -0.1407
IntestinalFailure 0.0017 0.0027 0.0028 0.0187
Cardiology 0.0007 0.0467 0.0526 0.0169
CleftLip -0.0423 -0.0423 -0.0417 -0.0319
InfectiousDiseaes 0.2129 0.2174 0.2163 0.2086
Liver 0.0754 0.0727 0.0710 0.0384
Children 0.1997 0.1988 0.2052 0.1868
Dermatology -0.0087 -0.0102 -0.0145 -0.0294
Rheumatology 0.1298 0.1303 0.1285 0.0819
Endocrinology -0.0071 -0.0093 -0.0107 -0.0035
Respiratory -0.0381 -0.0404 -0.0459 -0.0770
VascularDiseases 0.2112 0.2825 0.2872 0.2911
PainManagement 0.1902 0.1886 0.1885 0.2174
EarSurgery -0.0006 0.0290 0.0221 0.0076
Colorectal 0.2105 0.2104 0.2111 0.0335
Orthopaedic 0.2130 0.2135 0.2119 0.2051
MorbidObesity -0.0075 -0.0091 -0.0094 -0.0270
MetabolicDisorders -0.0155 -0.0192 -0.0229 -0.0100
Ophthalmology 0.0570 0.0563 0.0568 0.0621
Haemoglobinopathy 0.0031 0.0042 0.0054 0.0147
N 12,154,599 11,898,082 11,277,314 6,221,240
R2 0.0020 0.0021 0.0023 0.0045
R2within 0.0017 0.0017 0.0018 0.0041
R2 between 0.1656 0.1801 0.1919 0.0925
RHO 0.0239 0.0253 0.0266 0.0546
Linear model - Equation 2
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6.5 Estimates of cost efficiency
As already noted, the models that we have estimated have a low R2. This is because they are not
intended to identify the many reasons why costs might vary among patients. Nevertheless, we are
able to assess what proportion of the variation in costs is due to the hospital in which patients are
treated. This is indicated by the ‘R2 within’ and ‘R2 between’ statistics. The latter is consistently much
higher than the former, suggesting that patients within the same hospital tend to be more similar to
one another than they are to patients seen in other hospitals.
The random effect captures the hospital’s influence on costs over and above the influence of the other
patient-level variables accounted for in the model. Consequently these random effects can be
interpreted as measures of each hospital’s cost efficiency. The cost of a typical patient in a hospital
with a relatively large random effect is higher than the cost of a comparable patient treated in a
hospital with a lower random effect. Interpretation of these random effects as measures of relative
cost efficiency is conditional upon having properly accounted for other factors that might explain
variation in patient costs.
Consider equations 2 and 4 both of which account for the clustering of patients in hospitals. In
equation 2 we account for the HRG to which the patient is allocated and whether or not they received
specialised care. Thus the random effects are not contaminated by these factors. But they might be
contaminated by other patient characteristics if there are systematic differences in the types of
patients that hospitals treat that are not already captured by HRGs and the specialised markers.
Equation 4 accounts for these characteristics and, therefore, the random effects from this specification
provide a more accurate indication of each hospital’s relative cost efficiency than does equation 2.
That said there is little practical difference between the two sets of random effects, the correlation
amounting to 97.3%. This implies that patients do not differ systematically across hospitals in terms of
the set of characteristics that are accounted for in equation 4.
Hospitals can be ranked according to their cost efficiency as captured by the random effect, ordered
from those with the lowest average costs for their patients to those with the highest average costs.
The orderings from the linear and logarithmic forms of equation 4 are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Hospitals ranking distribution based on random effects estimates
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7. Conclusion
Unless the basis for the claims that specialist hospitals require top-up payments can be established,
the financial incentives introduced by prospective payment to encourage cost reducing behaviour will
be diluted. In this paper we have explored the basis for these claims by assessing the marginal costs
associated with receipt of specialised care for all patients treated in English hospitals during 2008/09.
We estimate various multiple regressions in order, firstly, to establish the extent to which the receipt of
specialised care is associated with higher treatment and, secondly, to evaluate hospital performance
in controlling costs. We explore how robust the results are to a range of analytical choices by
conducting various sensitivity analyses.
For some specialised markers our analysis suggests that costs are indeed higher than for other
patients allocated to the same HRG. Our preferred model for evaluating the costs associated with
receipt of specialised care accounts for the clustering of patients within hospital but ignores other
patient characteristics that may not be adequately captured by the HRG to which the patient is
allocated. We recommend a linear rather a logarithmic specification, as the estimates from the former
are closer to those derived from generalised linear models, which could not be computed when
allowance was made for clustering of patients in hospitals.
We find that, after allowing for the hospital in which treatment is provided, costs are higher than for
other patients allocated to the same HRG if a patient receives one of the following types of
specialised service:
x cancer (18% higher cost)
x spinal (28%),
x neurosciences (23%),
x cystic fibrosis (38%),
x infectious disease (21%),
x children (20%),
x rheumatology (13%),
x vascular diseases (21%),
x colorectal (21%) and
x orthopaedic (21%).
The implication for Payment by Results is that ‘top-up’ payments for patients with these markers might
be made over and above the tariff associated with the HRG to which they are allocated. This would
ensure that the payment policy relating to specialised services is consistent with the patient-based
reimbursement arrangements of Payment by Results. Additional payments would not be made in the
presence of the other specialised care markers, there being insufficient evidence to suggest that the
costs associated with these types of specialised care drive higher costs.
We recommend that the size of additional top-up amounts to the percentage increase in costs as
reported above, these estimates being derived from our preferred model specification (the linear form
of equation 2). However, different values could be adopted, justified on other grounds. These grounds
may include:
x Transitional arrangements, notably for children’s services, where the recommended value of
20% is substantially lower than the current 78% top-up;
x Materiality, where an additional top-up would have limited financial consequence for those
types of specialised services that are delivered to only a small number of patients;
x Sensitivity to model specification. The other model specifications generally imply lower top-up
values than those recommended above, with the exception of a model that fails to allow for
each hospital’s influence on costs.
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Our analysis demonstrates that there is substantial variation in the average cost of treatment across
the hospital sector, and that this variation is due neither to differences in the factor prices faced by
hospitals, nor to the provision of specialised services, and nor to the casemix, socio-demographic and
diagnostic characteristics of each hospital’s patients. After controlling for these diverse reasons for
cost variation, we are able to rank hospitals according to their relative cost efficiency. Those hospitals
rated as relatively inefficient will struggle financially under Payment by Results.
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Appendix tables
We have seen in Table 2 that there has been a loss of approximately 2.3 million episodes due to the
mismatch between the HES and the HRG4 databases. One of the reasons for this mismatch is that
Reference Costs are not reported for some types of activity. These are reported in Table A1. There
remain 1.8m HES records without an associated Reference Cost. These are described by HRG
chapter in Table A2 and by provider in Table A3.
Table A1: Mismatch frequencies by areas of treatment
Mismatch Freq. Percent
Other areas 1,807,827 76.68
Renal dialysis 316,152 13.41
Well babies 113,609 4.82
Undefined/Used 96,777 4.10
Mental health 8,395 0.36
Cystic fibrosis 8,264 0.35
Intermediate care 4,249 0.18
Chemotherapy 2,504 0.11
Total 2,357,777
Table A2: Mismatch frequencies by HRG chapter
HRG chapter Freq. Percent HRG chapter Freq. Percent
FZ 381,756 21.12 PB 25,447 1.41
NZ 202,737 11.21 BZ 24,868 1.38
PA 127,387 7.05 HA 24,707 1.37
DZ 111,445 6.16 MB 23,200 1.28
LB 81,089 4.49 HC 19,271 1.07
WA 79,741 4.41 JD 17,567 0.97
EB 75,512 4.18 AB 14,893 0.82
CZ 69,597 3.85 GB 14,176 0.78
LA 59,835 3.31 KC 11,576 0.64
JA 55,832 3.09 GA 6,762 0.37
SA 54,327 3.01 KB 6,546 0.36
AA 51,369 2.84 VA 5,569 0.31
JC 48,122 2.66 KA 4,310 0.24
HD 47,419 2.62 JB 3,470 0.19
QZ 41,832 2.31 HR 1,709 0.09
HB 33,579 1.86 WF 329 0.02
EA 28,249 1.56 MC 54 0.00
GC 26,864 1.49 Total 1,807,827 100
MA 26,681 1.48
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Table A3: Mismatch frequencies by provider code
Code Freq. Percent Code Freq. Percent Code Freq. Percent Code Freq. Percent
RYQ 168,831 9.34 RJE 12,625 0.70 RNZ 5,718 0.32 RXF 3,144 0.17
RGT 122,841 6.79 RBA 12,563 0.69 RNH 5,576 0.31 RFR 2,820 0.16
RYR 119,142 6.59 RXK 12,157 0.67 RXC 5,530 0.31 RQX 2,804 0.16
RXN 40,657 2.25 RTK 11,807 0.65 RDU 5,420 0.30 RJF 2,620 0.14
RK5 40,581 2.24 REF 11,365 0.63 RF4 5,443 0.30 RCC 2,372 0.13
RQ8 40,115 2.22 RGQ 11,386 0.63 RJ7 5,483 0.30 RC9 2,125 0.12
RNJ 38,565 2.13 RNQ 10,938 0.61 RN3 5,456 0.30 RCB 2,169 0.12
RTE 31,500 1.74 RCU 10,310 0.57 RV8 5,466 0.30 RRF 2,082 0.12
RBN 28,802 1.59 RVW 10,111 0.56 RCX 5,293 0.29 RCF 2,056 0.11
RJZ 27,353 1.51 RDZ 9,916 0.55 RWF 5,239 0.29 RBZ 1,807 0.10
RW3 24,702 1.37 RD7 9,633 0.53 RBL 5,053 0.28 RGM 1,792 0.10
RHU 24,417 1.35 RVR 9,520 0.53 RFS 5,040 0.28 RM3 1,836 0.10
RR8 24,057 1.33 RGC 9,344 0.52 RKE 5,079 0.28 RBD 1,552 0.09
RAS 21,381 1.18 RJ2 9,384 0.52 RN7 5,071 0.28 RC3 1,565 0.09
RHW 21,109 1.17 RTG 9,402 0.52 RXH 5,145 0.28 RD1 1,642 0.09
RTD 20,986 1.16 RHM 9,005 0.50 RC1 4,935 0.27 RM4 1,582 0.09
RVV 20,992 1.16 RL4 8,763 0.48 RDE 4,822 0.27 RWH 1,702 0.09
RM2 20,462 1.13 RWG 8,593 0.48 RJD 4,838 0.27 RA9 1,399 0.08
RQM 19,908 1.10 RA3 8,405 0.46 RQ3 4,855 0.27 RLT 1,472 0.08
RW6 19,820 1.10 RGR 8,382 0.46 RQW 4,914 0.27 RMP 1,421 0.08
RXW 18,761 1.04 RWD 8,143 0.45 RWW 4,824 0.27 RQ6 1,390 0.08
RH8 17,757 0.98 RBK 7,851 0.43 RPA 4,544 0.25 RE9 1,303 0.07
RDD 17,507 0.97 RXP 7,457 0.41 RK9 4,337 0.24 RNL 1,312 0.07
RHQ 17,603 0.97 RRK 7,171 0.40 RWY 4,140 0.23 RVY 1,312 0.07
RD8 17,357 0.96 RFF 6,975 0.39 RFW 3,974 0.22 RBV 1,167 0.06
RA7 16,994 0.94 RXR 7,125 0.39 RJ6 3,990 0.22 RL1 1,091 0.06
RAP 16,525 0.91 RNS 6,817 0.38 RAX 3,819 0.21 RWA 1,013 0.06
RTR 15,905 0.88 RTF 6,911 0.38 RT3 3,844 0.21 RA4 908 0.05
RR1 15,647 0.87 RTH 6,888 0.38 RVJ 3,767 0.21 RAN 903 0.05
RNA 15,284 0.85 RAL 6,751 0.37 RA2 3,547 0.20 RLQ 968 0.05
RP4 15,438 0.85 RVL 6,729 0.37 RAE 3,585 0.20 RPC 986 0.05
RAJ 15,120 0.84 RYJ 6,709 0.37 REP 3,524 0.19 RPY 840 0.05
RX1 15,256 0.84 RD3 6,439 0.36 RGN 3,470 0.19 REN 775 0.04
RTP 14,702 0.81 REM 6,525 0.36 RLU 3,471 0.19 RJC 755 0.04
RXL 14,360 0.79 RP5 6,514 0.36 RMC 3,483 0.19 RQQ 440 0.02
RWP 14,055 0.78 RRV 6,420 0.36 RXQ 3,434 0.19 RBF 147 0.01
RJL 13,915 0.77 RGP 6,246 0.35 RR7 3,297 0.18 RET 152 0.01
RWJ 13,867 0.77 RKB 6,317 0.35 RBT 3,051 0.17 RRJ 168 0.01
RJ1 13,779 0.76 RJR 6,170 0.34 RCD 3,025 0.17 RBB 85 0.00
RLN 13,495 0.75 RTX 6,146 0.34 RJN 3,060 0.17 RBQ 30 0.00
RM1 13,440 0.74 RWE 6,202 0.34 RN5 3,015 0.17 Total 1,807,827 100.00
RBS 12,565 0.70 RN1 5,846 0.32 RP6 3,029 0.17
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Table A4: Provider information
Code Name Activity
%
SPEC
%
MISSING
RHQ Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 262,260 41.60 4.87
RR1 Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust 239,786 5.69 28.78
RR8 Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust 219,508 12.16 9.59
RWE University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust 217,118 12.15 2.65
RW6 Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust 211,950 5.28 13.68
RTH Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS Trust 204,652 35.48 1.87
RXN Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 187,670 7.40 21.20
RX1 Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust 186,265 12.92 7.64
RTD
The Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust 185,984 15.96 9.31
RJ1 Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust 172,111 14.23 7.62
RVJ North Bristol NHS Trust 170,176 39.19 1.06
RM1 Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust 169,430 24.25 0.88
RTE Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 167,014 4.53 13.90
RW3
Central Manchester and Manchester Children's
University Hospitals NHS Trust 164,589 24.59 38.84
RYJ Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 162,142 14.29 1.89
RAL Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust 161,915 9.47 56.47
RJE University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust 161,382 19.27 7.53
RWA Hull and East Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust 147,710 10.09 4.21
RWD United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust 145,357 3.57 7.25
RVV East Kent Hospitals NHS Trust 139,217 6.27 11.92
RTG Derby Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 139,135 5.82 2.87
RTR South Tees Hospitals NHS Trust 138,797 11.06 10.29
RHU Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust 137,697 6.60 13.82
RXF Mid Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust 134,727 3.62 3.80
RXK Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust 133,412 4.25 6.83
RF4 Barking, Havering and Redbridge Hospitals NHS Trust 128,014 5.37 1.58
RHW Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust 127,642 4.76 44.67
REF Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust 125,050 7.46 11.01
RA7 United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust 124,047 16.01 9.04
RH8 Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust 123,775 13.78 12.51
RXP County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust 122,008 4.05 4.06
RKB
University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS
Trust 121,197 9.14 2.90
RHM Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust 120,915 19.95 1.44
RNA Dudley Group of Hospitals NHS Trust 114,116 9.83 13.05
RL4 The Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust 111,776 14.89 6.25
RLN City Hospitals Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust 111,194 5.33 8.78
RJ7 St George's Healthcare NHS Trust 110,070 13.04 3.76
RTF Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust 109,498 4.15 2.37
RXL
Blackpool, Fylde and Wyre Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust 108,808 7.32 8.38
RK9 Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust 108,714 11.28 1.58
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RM3 Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust 108,013 17.76 1.36
RRK University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust 107,673 36.17 5.25
RXR East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust 106,326 3.70 6.53
RWP Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust 104,757 3.96 9.69
RAE Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 104,325 5.11 1.99
RQ6
Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals
NHS Trust 104,147 14.87 1.59
RJZ King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 102,280 24.89 20.45
RXC East Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust 101,687 5.16 4.43
RDZ
The Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals
NHS Foundation Trust 101,650 2.66 10.44
RVL Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust 101,349 5.97 6.33
RWY Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust 100,291 4.02 0.65
RXH Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals NHS Trust 99,849 10.71 4.78
RP5
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust 98,760 5.13 3.35
RRV
University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust 97,927 16.61 5.64
RTX University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Trust 95,646 3.66 11.13
RBL
Wirral University Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation
Trust 94,009 3.37 3.74
RXW Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust 93,811 7.32 14.50
REM Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 91,782 20.54 1.77
RV8 North West London Hospitals NHS Trust 91,214 4.73 4.38
RNJ Barts and The London NHS Trust 90,943 25.93 46.11
RQ8 Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust 90,653 6.45 40.72
RDD
Basildon and Thurrock University Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust 89,919 11.03 18.45
RJL
Northern Lincolnshire and Goole Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust 89,911 6.91 32.28
RWH East and North Hertfordshire NHS Trust 89,487 4.08 5.23
RWF Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust 88,435 5.73 7.03
RXQ Buckinghamshire Hospitals NHS Trust 87,992 4.43 1.75
RNS Northampton General Hospital NHS Trust 86,029 5.00 7.80
RNL North Cumbria Acute Hospitals NHS Trust 85,559 8.36 0.74
RVR Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust 85,366 6.29 12.70
RVW North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Foundation Trust 82,838 2.60 14.06
RBN St Helens and Knowsley Hospitals NHS Trust 80,689 2.14 22.83
RAJ Southend University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 80,643 4.36 16.97
RWJ Stockport NHS Foundation Trust 80,028 3.66 15.66
RWW North Cheshire Hospitals NHS Trust 78,665 4.11 8.45
RRF Wrightington, Wigan and Leigh NHS Trust 77,716 4.98 2.09
RK5 Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 77,150 3.24 41.56
RBA Taunton and Somerset NHS Foundation Trust 75,812 5.54 17.04
RM2
University Hospital of South Manchester NHS
Foundation Trust 75,779 12.16 21.76
RDU Frimley Park Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 75,397 3.95 4.02
RGQ Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust 74,511 5.08 12.69
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RD7
Heatherwood and Wexham Park Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust 74,244 4.74 8.02
RD3 Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 73,557 5.96 8.67
RGN
Peterborough and Stamford Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust 73,346 5.10 0.92
RN3 Swindon and Marlborough NHS Trust 72,659 4.77 5.07
RGC Whipps Cross University Hospital NHS Trust 71,471 5.97 11.30
RCB York Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 71,306 4.35 0.45
RMC Bolton Hospitals NHS Trust 71,124 3.56 5.70
RDE Essex Rivers Healthcare NHS Trust 70,918 5.12 7.52
RWG West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust 70,882 5.44 8.97
RFR The Rotherham NHS Foundation Trust 70,014 5.31 0.89
RC9 Luton and Dunstable Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 67,763 6.33 0.90
RFS Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 67,383 4.77 9.59
RGP
James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust 67,292 4.12 24.72
RNQ Kettering General Hospital NHS Trust 67,002 5.86 11.87
RTP Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust 65,759 3.56 23.11
RD1 Royal United Hospital Bath NHS Trust 64,724 6.45 1.76
RA9 South Devon Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust 64,289 6.66 0.57
RBT Mid Cheshire Hospitals NHS Trust 64,282 2.97 1.20
RJR Countess of Chester Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 63,654 4.83 23.45
RJ6 Mayday Healthcare NHS Trust 63,533 5.00 5.27
RQM
Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation
Trust 63,501 8.49 28.17
RPA Medway NHS Trust 63,483 4.38 11.75
RTK Ashford and St Peter's Hospitals NHS Trust 62,933 5.75 16.43
RCX The Queen Elizabeth Hospital King's Lynn NHS Trust 61,506 3.65 3.26
RJD Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 60,626 4.35 7.60
RBK Walsall Hospitals NHS Trust 60,306 5.45 10.44
RQW The Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust 59,603 5.43 6.68
RD8 Milton Keynes Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 58,759 4.24 27.71
RAX Kingston Hospital NHS Trust 58,615 4.47 4.93
RA2 Royal Surrey County Hospital NHS Trust 58,545 9.46 4.41
RVY Southport and Ormskirk Hospital NHS Trust 58,077 3.94 7.49
RNZ Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust 57,283 6.08 8.05
RFF Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 56,922 5.31 8.81
RNH Newham University Hospital NHS Trust 55,627 1.57 3.42
RJ2 The Lewisham Hospital NHS Trust 53,741 7.51 21.31
RBD Dorset County Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 53,512 4.93 3.03
RAS The Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust 52,981 4.17 40.14
RCF Airedale NHS Trust 52,426 4.16 7.85
RGR West Suffolk Hospitals NHS Trust 51,777 4.30 11.67
RPY The Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust 51,303 1.68 1.96
RN5
Basingstoke and North Hampshire NHS Foundation
Trust 49,507 3.46 6.07
RMP Tameside Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 49,022 3.54 0.85
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RKE The Whittington Hospital NHS Trust 47,585 7.97 17.61
RJC South Warwickshire General Hospitals NHS Trust 45,703 4.02 0.73
RN1 Winchester and Eastleigh Healthcare NHS Trust 45,700 5.46 8.84
RC3 Ealing Hospital NHS Trust 44,952 2.78 7.00
RJF Burton Hospitals NHS Trust 44,505 3.34 1.61
RQX Homerton University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 44,268 4.11 4.36
RAP North Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust 43,709 4.90 34.81
RBZ Northern Devon Healthcare NHS Trust 43,581 5.24 4.83
RC1 Bedford Hospital NHS Trust 42,717 6.34 13.41
RN7 Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust 42,693 2.54 6.78
RCD Harrogate and District NHS Foundation Trust 39,889 3.49 6.90
RCC
Scarborough and North East Yorkshire Health Care
NHS Trust 38,958 3.35 4.98
RFW West Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust 38,358 5.25 3.11
RLT George Eliot Hospital NHS Trust 38,145 4.20 2.87
RR7 Gateshead Health NHS Foundation Trust 37,185 2.06 5.55
RA4 Yeovil District Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 36,678 3.93 0.51
RJN East Cheshire NHS Trust 35,844 3.75 5.53
RBS Royal Liverpool Children's NHS Trust 34,807 32.99 23.19
RQQ Hinchingbrooke Health Care NHS Trust 33,692 6.06 0.60
RE9 South Tyneside NHS Foundation Trust 32,041 3.30 0.60
RQ3 Birmingham Children's Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 32,040 55.42 20.92
RLQ Hereford Hospitals NHS Trust 31,050 5.55 2.14
RA3 Weston Area Health NHS Trust 29,719 3.26 25.53
REP Liverpool Women's NHS Foundation Trust 29,510 0.73 12.18
RM4 Trafford Healthcare NHS Trust 28,536 6.03 10.27
RP6 Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 27,336 4.65 11.65
RT3 Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust 26,818 57.89 13.20
RCU Sheffield Children's NHS Foundation Trust 23,875 31.51 40.40
RBV Christie Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 22,730 18.02 5.41
RGM Papworth Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 21,039 68.00 11.26
RP4 Great Ormond Street Hospital For Children NHS Trust 19,418 56.55 71.64
RPC Queen Victoria Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 18,061 10.64 5.45
RLU Birmingham Women's NHS Foundation Trust 17,006 1.40 21.70
RRJ The Royal Orthopaedic Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 16,485 9.88 1.29
RAN Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital NHS Trust 10,596 22.51 8.52
RBQ The Cardiothoracic Centre - Liverpool NHS Trust 10,328 56.31 2.78
RL1
Robert Jones and Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic and District
Hospital NHS Trust 10,239 6.56 10.61
RBF Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre NHS Trust 9,518 3.57 1.82
RET
Walton Centre for Neurology and Neurosurgery NHS
Trust 8,523 23.61 48.90
REN
Clatterbridge Centre for Oncology NHS Foundation
Trust 4,433 8.13 17.64
RBB
Royal National Hospital for Rheumatic Diseases NHS
Foundation Trust 3,533 0.32 2.92
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Table A5: Full estimation results, equation 4
Linear Loglinear Linear Loglinear
b/signif b/signif b/signif b/signif
Cancer 0.186 *** 0.127 *** obesity 0.013 0.013
BMT -0.089 -0.02 allergy 0.026 *** 0.043 ***
Haemophilia -0.2 * -0.104 diabetes -0.008 -0.006
Womens -0.016 0.017 hypertens 0.047 0.044 ***
Spinal 0.269 *** 0.259 *** haemorr 0.081 ** -0.054 **
Neurosciences 0.167 *** 0.181 *** histdis 0.02 * 0.03 ***
Cystic fibrosis 0.33 *** 0.181 *** riskfact 0.001 -0.009
Renal -0.086 0.038 congmalf 0.051 *** 0.022
Intestinal failure -0.019 0.046 risk_phys -0.007 -0.044
Cardiology -0.059 0.122 *** risk_psysoc 0.192 *** 0.108 ***
Cleft lip -0.014 0.006 tr_in_eli 0.008 -0.031
Infectious diseases 0.202 *** -0.082 tr_in_noneli 0.16 ** 0.122 ***
Liver 0.063 0.031 tr_out_eli 0.14 *** 0.023
Children 0.172 *** 0.088 ** tr_out_noneli 0.129 *** 0.05 ***
Dermatology -0.004 -0.072 die 0.072 *** 0.004
Rheumatology 0.16 *** 0.241 *** emerg -0.013 -0.079 ***
Endocrinology 0.011 0.021 Episodes 0.108 *** 0.201 ***
Respiratory -0.073 -0.159
East of
England 0.115 0.033
Vascular diseases 0.173 ** 0.059 London 0.16 *** 0.044
Pain Management 0.217 -0.188 North-East 0.022 -0.021
Ear surgery 0.018 0.057 North-West 0.009 -0.054
Colorectal 0.212 *** 0.166 *** South-East 0.068 0.048
Orthopaedic 0.222 *** 0.207 *** South-West 0.007 -0.038
Morbid obesity -0.01 0.018 West Midlands 0.044 0.016
Metabolic disorders 0.002 -0.343 * Yorkshire 0.055 0.059 *
Ophthalmology 0.077 0.091 Urban -0.003 -0.003
Haemoglobinopathy 0.013 -0.106 ** White 0.015 ** 0.007
imd04c 0 -0.003 Female 0.599 0.167
imd04ed 0 0 Male 0.6 0.183
imd04hd -0.009 -0.008 * Age 0.085 0.02 **
imd04hs 0 0 ** Age2 -0.002 -0.001 ***
imd04i 0.09 ** 0.013 Age3 0 * 0 ***
imd04ia -0.047 * -0.018 Female*Age -0.086 -0.022 **
imd04ic -0.078 *** -0.029 * Female*Age2 0.002 0.001 ***
imd04le 0 0 Female*Age3 0 * 0 ***
imd04rk 0 *** 0 *** Male*Age -0.087 -0.024 **
pregnancy 0.079 *** 0.116 *** Male*Age2 0.002 0.001 ***
drug -0.001 -0.038 *** Male*Age3 0 * 0 ***
alcohol -0.041 *** -0.078 *** Constant 0.26 -0.537 ***
smoke -0.008 0.012 N 12,154,599 12,154,599
Note: Significance level - *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Clustered SE by hospital ID
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Table A6 variable labels and definitions
Variable name Description
imd04c Index of Multiple Deprivation: Crime
imd04ed Index of Multiple Deprivation: Education, Skills and training
imd04hd Index of Multiple Deprivation: Health Deprivation and Disability
imd04hs Index of Multiple Deprivation: Barriers to Housing and Services
imd04i Index of Multiple Deprivation: Income deprivation
imd04ia Index of Multiple Deprivation:Income Deprivation Affecting Older People
imd04ic Index of Multiple Deprivation: Income Deprivation Affecting Children
imd04le Index of Multiple Deprivation: Living Environment
imd04rk Index of Multiple Deprivation: Overall ranking
pregnancy =1, One of the patient diagnosis is: pregnancy,childbirth or puerperium
drug =1, Patient is drug user or drug dependent
alcohol =1, Patient is alcohol user or alcohol dependent
smoke =1, Patient is tobacco user or tobacco dependent
obesity =1, Patient with obesity problems
allergy =1, Patient with personal history of allergy
diabetes =1, Patient with diabetes problems
hypertens =1, Patient with hypertension problems
haemorr =1, Patient with haemorrage/coagulation problems
histdis =1, Patient with personal history of diseases
riskfact =1, Patient with other lifestyle risk factors
congmalf =1, Patient with congenital malformations
risk_phys =1, Patient exposed to physical risk factors
risk_psysoc =1, Patient with problems related to psychosocial circumstances
tr_in_el =1, Patient transferred from an eligible provider
tr_in_nonel =1, Patient transferred from a non-eligible provider
tr_out_el =1, Patient transferred to an eligible provider
tr_out_nonel =1, Patient transferred to a non-eligible provider
die =1, Patient died
emerg =1, Patient admitted as emergency
episodes Number of episodes in the spell
East of England =1, Region of treatment: East of England
London =1, Region of treatment: London
North-East =1, Region of treatment: North-East
North-West =1, Region of treatment: North-West
South-East =1, Region of treatment: South-East
South-West =1, Region of treatment: South-West
West Midlands =1, Region of treatment: West Midlands
Yorkshire =1, Region of treatment: Yorkshire
urban1 =1, Urban area
white1 =1, ethnicity is white
female1 =1, Patient is female
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male1 =1, Patient is male
age Patient age at the beginning of the spell
age2 Squared patient age
age3 Cubic power of patient age
femage Interaction: Age*Female
femage2 Interaction: Squared age*Female
femage3 Interaction: Cubic age*Female
malage Interaction: Age*Male
malage2 Interaction: Squared age*Male
malage3 Interaction: Cubic age*Male
